Rather than showing either continued religious revival or straightforward secularization, Arab Muslim societies from 2010 to 2022 exhibited trends toward religious polarization, since both highly religious and non-religious populations grew simultaneously at the expense of moderately religious individuals, with significant variations across countries, demographics, and time periods. In a study reported in the International Journal of Comparative Sociology (online February 21), Arman Azedi (American University, Washington, DC) makes use of recent data from the Arab Barometer, finding no consistent region-wide decrease in personal religiosity from 2010 to 2022. Instead, he identifies three distinct periods of fluctuation: (1) the mid-2010s decline (2012–2019), when personal religiosity decreased across 9 of the 11 countries studied (a decline that was largely confined to men and youth, with women and older generations maintaining their existing levels of religiosity); (2) the Covid-19 surge (2020–early 2021), which triggered a sharp resurgence in religious commitments across all countries where data was available (aligning with psychological research showing that people often turn to religion to cope with crises and disruptions); and (3) the post-Covid decline (late 2021–2022), when, with the easing of pandemic restrictions, religiosity began to decline again (but this time more comprehensively across demographic groups).
By 2022, however, aggregate levels of religiosity had not yet reached the lows seen during the mid-2010s. Over the entire period, the “somewhat religious” middle category dropped 9.2 percentage points from 56.7 percent to 47.5 percent, while the “religious” category increased in most countries (by 6.9 percentage points, from 35.1 percent to 42 percent) and the “not religious” category registered a small increase of 2.4 percentage points (from 8.2 percent to 10.6 percent). Country variations are significant, though, with Libya showing the clearest evidence of religious decline, defined as people leaving both “religious” and “somewhat religious” categories to join the “not religious” category. Algeria, Jordan, and Sudan experienced rising religiosity. Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia showed evidence of polarization, with both “religious” and “not religious” categories growing at the expense of the middle group. Palestine showed no significant changes during the study period. Interestingly, the study found that trends in personal religiosity did not align with fluctuations in support for political Islam. For instance, Libya experienced declining personal religiosity but rising support for political Islam. Algeria was the only country where both personal religiosity and support for political Islam increased consistently. Overall, the study challenges simplistic narratives about either continued Islamic revival or straightforward secularization in Arab societies, revealing a complex picture of polarization, demographic differences, and contextual fluctuations influenced by regional and global events. For example, the mid-2010s religious decline was possibly connected to negative reactions toward ISIS and disillusionment with Islamist political movements.
(International Journal of Comparative Sociology, https://journals.sagepub.com/home/COS; Arab Barometer, https://www.arabbarometer.org/)
