Historical trajectories, ideological differences, and shifting geopolitical realities shaped both the making and unmaking of the Islamist alliance between the current ruling party of Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the (Arabic) Muslim Brotherhood (MB), writes historian Jan-Markus Vömel in a detailed report published by the Documentation Centre Political Islam in Vienna, Austria (April). Turkish Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood developed separately, with limited ideological transfer. Over time, however, both movements recognized each other as “sister organizations” representing local expressions of a global Islamic revival and converged at key moments, especially during the Arab Spring. Moreover, migration from Turkey and the Arab world to Europe created a unique space for Islamist networking, free from home-country repression, leading the MB and Turkish Islamists to develop parallel but sometimes overlapping networks.
The Arab Spring (2010–11) marked the high point of cooperation. Turkey (under the AKP), Qatar, and MB-affiliated groups in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere formed a “revolutionary camp” seeking to reshape the Middle East along populist-Islamist lines. This alliance faced a counter-revolutionary bloc led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and—later—post-coup Egypt, which viewed the MB as a threat and labeled it a terrorist organization. MB-inspired parties won elections in Egypt and some other Arab countries, but the 2013 Egyptian coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi resulted in a brutal crackdown on the MB. Thousands fled, with Turkey (especially Istanbul) becoming a key hub for exiled MB members and media. The MB lost ground across the region. Realizing that the MB was unlikely to regain power in the foreseeable future, Turkey began a pragmatic rapprochement with the other camp, reducing overt support for the MB while maintaining discreet ties. Turkey restrained the MB’s media work on its territory, revoked the Turkish citizenship granted to some 50 Brotherhood functionaries, and even agreed to deportations of wanted members to Egypt.
Turkish Islamism and the MB retained distinct ideological traditions and strategic cultures. The alliance was always fragile, prone to unravel under pressure from external setbacks and internal disagreements. The AKP’s initial appeal as a model for democratic Islamism faded as Turkey itself became more authoritarian and as the specificities of Arab political contexts proved resistant to Turkish-style transformation. The failure of the MB and its allies to consolidate power led to a regional realignment, with Turkey and Qatar recalibrating their foreign policies to accommodate the realities of a resurgent status-quo bloc. Turkish rapprochement with counter-revolutionary Middle Eastern regimes is expected to continue, though local crises may cause temporary shifts. On the other hand, following the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Turkey became a more open supporter of Hamas, which currently is “the foremost remaining Turkish alliance with a Muslim Brotherhood-heritage organization.”
(The full report in English can be downloaded from the website of the Documentation Centre Political Islam: https://www.dokumentationsstelle.at/en/)
