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FEATURE STORY:

The sex abuse crisis and the puzzle of Catholic “nones”

Charges and counter-charges of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church heated up considerably this summer, with allegations of abuse and coverup reaching to the top of the Church hierarchy, including Theodore McCarrick, the first-ever U.S. cardinal accused of sexual abuse to resign. While the hierarchy is the focus of this recent wave of abuse and collusion, much of the press coverage has looked at parish-level Catholics and how this might damage their relationship with the Church. It is certain that the material costs of the scandal though lawsuits will continue to impact—in some cases bankrupt—dioceses and in turn parish life (the lawsuits have targeted dioceses and religious orders rather than parishes, since individual churches have little authority over their priests). Much of the data on Catholics’ attitudes to abuse is still related to the parish-level sexual abuse by priests and coverup by local bishops that was revealed during the first wave of this scandal that broke in the early 2000s. Observers are now wondering if high-level involvement in the crisis might lead to greater disaffection from the Church. The *Washington Post* (August 19) notes that “[s]urveys have rarely asked about the Catholic Church’s response to the crisis since 2013, when a Washington Post-ABC News poll found that 78 percent of Catholics disapproved of the way the church had handled the scandal—more than a decade after a Boston Globe investigation prompted the church to overhaul its procedures for rooting out abusive priests.”

In the *Post* article, Julie Zauzmer, Michelle Boorstein, and Michael Brice-Saddler provide an anecdotal picture of reactions to the latest scandals—ranging “from those who can’t be shocked anymore to those who were newly grieved, from those who feel Catholics are unfairly singled out to those who maintain their faith in the religion but not its leaders.” Patricia McGuire, president of Trinity Washington University, saw this summer as sowing new doubts. “The fact that we thought all the worst had come out already—this is what creates cynicism. People were like, ‘Okay, it’s all cleaned up, now we’re moving on.’ ... Now we know: The church is a fallible human organization.” Others cited the ongoing scandal’s impact on young people who already show high

rates of disenchantment with religious and other institutions. In any event, it appears that the crisis is widely perceived as adding to the growing ranks of non-affiliated (or “none”) Catholics in the U.S. According to Pew research in 2015, about 27 percent of former Catholics who no longer identified with a religion cited clergy sexual abuse scandals as a reason for leaving the Church, while 21 percent of former Catholics identifying as Protestant did so. But *National Public Radio* (August 18) reports that it is still unclear how the crisis affects Catholic attachment and affiliation with the Church.

Mary Gautier of the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate at Georgetown University is quoted in the report as saying that the reasons Catholics belong to a church and what they find meaningful in church may not have much to do with who the leader or bishop is. “It’s much more personal than that. It’s, ‘this is where I feel a connection to my God. This is the faith community that nourishes me.’” In a paper presented at an August meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion in Philadelphia, which **RW** attended, sociologist Carol Ann MacGregor reported that lapsed Catholics do differ significantly in their social and political views and behavior than other Catholics. MacGregor’s analysis did not include data on the abuse crisis and whether it might accelerate lapsing in the faith. She did find an unusually high level of dissent on sexual issues as well as an unexpectedly low rate of community involvement among formerly Catholic nones. Using data from the 2014 Pew Religious Landscape Survey, she found that lapsed Catholics had odds of supporting abortion that were nearly three times higher than those who were raised Catholic and were still practicing. Lapsed Catholics had two times higher odds of supporting homosexuality in general than their still-Catholic counterparts. MacGregor also found that lapsed Catholics had 49 percent lower odds of volunteering in the last seven days as compared to those who were raised Catholic and had remained so. She cautioned that it was not clear whether lapsed Catholics fell away because of their positions on sexual issues or whether their distance from Catholicism led to a weakening of their belief in official Church teaching.



ARTICLES

Judaism adjusting to multiracial congregations in Bay Area

A new generation of Jewish children in the Bay Area are being raised in multiracial households, according to the *Portrait of Bay Area Jewish Life and Communities* study released last February, which means that congregations will have to become accustomed to Jews who are black or have other backgrounds not usually associated with Judaism, writes Maya Mirsky in *The Jewish News of Northern California* (Aug. 10). Home to the fourth largest Jewish population in the U.S., with 350,000 Jews and 123,000 non-Jews living in 148,000 Jewish households, according to the study commissioned by the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco, Bay Area Judaism is admittedly very diverse in multiple ways. As noted in the press release for the study: “One-in-ten [Bay Area Jewish] households overall, and one-in-five in San Francisco specifically, include a lesbian, gay, or bisexual person. 25% of Bay Area Jewish households include a Hispanic, Asian-American, African-American, or a mixed or other ethnic or racial background (other than white) individual.” The researchers also found that interfaith marriage “rates vary widely by age, from a low of 42% among those 65 and older to a high of 66% among those 35 and under.”

The rise in interfaith marriages helps explain why there is “a real jump in non-whites” among younger Jews and Jewish households, remarks Steven M. Cohen (Hebrew Union College–Jewish Institute of Religion, New York). Seventy-five percent of Bay Area Jews between the ages of 18 and 34 are white, compared to 96 percent of those over 65. In Jewish schools, the number of



children of color raised in Jewish families is growing. Quoted in the *Jewish News* article, Rabbi Samantha Kahn (InterfaithFamily/Bay Area) says that one should no longer presume that the white person in a multiracial couple is the Jewish one. The article also reports on how the Jewish Federation of the East Bay has been trying to ensure that non-white families have been represented in its newsletter to local Jewish families, which contains information about programs for children and features a “family of the month.” Indeed, in the article several Jewish people with racially diverse family experiences emphasize the need to make non-white Jews feel part of the community in order to keep them connected. Along these lines, the educational programs of some synagogues are now teaching “that there are many types of Judaism, all of them normal.”

(A *Portrait of Bay Area Jewish Life and Communities*, <https://jewishfed.org/community-study>)

Noahides seen as useful allies for Zionists

The global growth of the Noahide movement, which consists of ex-Christians seeking to follow Jewish law and monotheism, has come to the attention of Jewish leaders who are trying to build support for world Zionism, but there are sharply differing views on how Jewish these new believers can be, writes Rachel Z. Feldman in the journal *Nova Religio* (22:1). The Noahide movement has grown to “tens of thousands” worldwide, as ex-Christians encounter forms of Jewish learning online. The movement has gained currency especially among those attracted to Judaism in the developing world who lack the resources and access to formally convert to the religion. Feldman focuses on the 2,000-member community in the Philippines and how Noahides have been “adopted” by Jewish leaders even as they counsel members that they cannot become Jewish and devise new rituals, which carry a strong Zionist thrust. In the Philippines, as elsewhere, Noahide believers consist of “evangelicals” who usually travel through messianic Judaism or a group known as the Sacred Name Believers, which started in the U.S. and consists of Sabbath-keeping churches searching for the Hebrew roots of Christianity.

The Noahides tend to establish “synagogues,” where they practice Jewish rituals based around observing the “seven laws” established by Noah (upholding ethical monotheism), such as holding a “seven blessings” service to honor the Sabbath (even if they cannot bless and fully observe the Sabbath in the way that ethnic Jews do). The belief that Jews are a “racially superior people with an innate physiological ability to access divinity” is common among Noahides, but this distinction serves to create a two-tier system that will keep the movement a separate religion from Judaism, according to Feldman. In the Philippines, Chabad (the outreach arm of a Hasidic Jewish group) serves as the Noahides’ mentors, and they draw a sharp distinction between Noahides and ethnic Jews, but in other countries such mentoring could come from another network of rabbis who might allow more Jewish practices to be adopted. But the majority of these Jewish advisors “are active members, or at least ideological supporters” of the Third Temple movement in Israel, which is attempting to rebuild the Third Jewish Temple, reestablish the Jewish priesthood and lay the foundation for a fully theocratic state, and which sees Noahides as valuable allies. Since 2011, this movement has “grown significantly, gaining support from the Israeli religious-nationalist




demographic and Israeli lawmakers, as well as international Christian and Noahide communities,” Feldman adds.

(*Nova Religio*, <http://nr.ucpress.edu>)

CURRENT RESEARCH

● **The increase in the number of Catholics who claim an evangelical identity and experience, such as being born again, may have more to do with different educational trajectories among Catholics than the alliance between evangelicalism and Catholicism or immigration, according to sociologists Samuel L. Perry and Cyrus Schleifer.** Writing in the *Review of Religious Research* (online August 23), the researchers find that the percentage of American Catholics reporting a born-again experience nearly doubled between 2004 (14 percent) and 2016 (27 percent). Analyzing data from the General Social Survey (2004–2016), Perry and Schleifer consider, and discount, such possible factors behind this development as the growing contact and coalitions between evangelicals and Catholics on pro-life issues, evangelical conversion to Catholicism, and immigration of Catholics from countries experiencing evangelical growth (such as some Latin American countries). Rather, they point to the fact that reporting a born-again experience has “taken place almost solely among those without a college degree. In contrast, Catholics with a college degree showed little increase in their likelihood of reporting a born-again experience over time.” This finding may mean that Catholics who are marginalized in American society may experience a weakening attachment to mainstream Catholic identity. They note that this pattern is only present among Catholics, thus the modest increase of Protestants reporting born-again experiences is likely due to other factors. Perry and Schleifer acknowledge that the causal arrow may move in the other direction of born-again Catholics attending college less than mainstream Catholics.



Trends in Born-Again Experience among Catholics across College Education and Gender


● **Evangelical women entering the workforce showed a drop-off in religious involvement, but no such effect was observed among Catholic women, according to a longitudinal study of women from these churches from 1975–2016.** The study, by Linda Kawentel of the University of Notre Dame, was presented at the recent meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion in Philadelphia, which **RW** attended. The researcher used the General Social Survey to analyze Catholic and evangelical women’s entrance into the workforce and their rate of religious involvement. The biggest effect on evangelical women was seen in the 1970s and 1980s, when there was a decrease in religious involvement as they took full-time jobs, though this pattern was also seen in the early 2000s. Mothers who did not work full-time attended church more and showed more overall religious involvement. For Catholic women the trajectory was very different, with those working full-time actually showing more religious involvement than non-working mothers. In the 2010s, the relationship between being in the workforce and religious involvement no longer varied between Catholic and evangelical women. Kawentel noted that it is not certain if entering the workforce alone was the major causative factor behind the drop-off in evangelical activity.



● **The personal religiosity of members of the U.S. Senate has long been thought to have an influence on their legislative behavior, but a new study finds that religious affiliation is less important in having such an impact, even while personal beliefs do have an effect.** The study, conducted by political scientist Daniel Arnon and published in the *Journal for the Scientific Study*

of Religion (online in August), compiled a data set of senators' religion that coded the religious tradition, engagement, and theology of over 150 senators during the 110th to 113th sessions of Congress (2007–2014). Arnon found that only religious beliefs had an enduring effect on the senators' legislative behavior. Some evangelical and Jewish traditions had some impact on senators' work, but most did not (practices were more difficult to ascertain and code in the data set). The effect of beliefs on legislative behavior involved not only culture-war issues but also diverse social issues. It was also found that while in the general public there may be an "attendance gap," where those attending church more often tend to be more politically conservative, this was not true of the senators. Arnon found that senators who were religiously engaged were not more likely to vote conservative.

(*Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14685906>)



● **Scientists who are politically liberal are more likely to be atheist than agnostic or other affiliations, according to a recent study by Rice University researchers.** The findings, based on a survey of 1,989 biologists and physicists, were presented at the August meeting of the American Sociological Association in Philadelphia, which **RW** attended. Sociologists Sharan Kaur Mehta, Robert Thomson, and Elaine Howard Ecklund found that scientists are more politically liberal than the American public in general. Thirty-five percent of the respondents were atheists, 29 percent agnostic, and 36 percent theists. There was no difference in rates of belief in God between political conservatives and left-leaning moderates, nor were differences in agnosticism and political leanings explained by religious controls. But liberals had higher odds of being atheists as opposed to both agnostics and believers in God, even with religious controls. The

researchers concluded that, “in contrast with agnosticism, atheism in the U.S. is overtly political [as] U.S. scientists draw upon both scientific and religious tools to construct political identities.”



● **Governments that restrict religious freedom tend to be clustered together and to mimic each other, even when accounting for internal policies and characteristics that drive such restrictions, according to a study by Dane Mataic in the *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (57:2).** Previous research on governmental restrictions of religion has suggested that internal factors, such as maintaining religious monopolies and the desire to control pluralism and resulting cultural conflict, explain policies that clamp down on minority faiths and favor alliances between majority religions and the state. But Mataic finds that restrictions on minority religions are clustered in particular regions, with the highest level of regulations and restrictions situated near China, Russia, and the Middle East.

The lowest levels of such restrictions are clustered in North and South America as well as southern Africa. The researcher calculated averages of restrictions for countries in these regions at four periods between 1990 and 2008 and found that the implementation of government restrictions increased and decreased over time in distinct spatial patterns. By analyzing 155 countries, Mataic found that while internal policies predicted a significant degree of government restrictions, the

diffusion of such policies and practices between neighboring countries (especially immediate neighbors) also accounted for the levels of restrictions and regulations in each society. Increases in restrictions in one year in one country tended to reflect high levels of restrictions among neighbors in previous years.



● **Italians are increasingly opting for cremation of the dead rather than traditional forms of burial despite the strong opposition to this practice of the Catholic Church in Italy, according to a study in the *Review of Religious Research* (online August 2).** Although Italy was actually the first European country to allow cremation in the 19th century, in practice it has been strongly discouraged by the Catholic Church and there has been little diffusion of it throughout the country. This is changing, however, as researchers Marco Breschi, Gabriele Ruiu, and Marco Francini find a growing trend of cremation after the passage of a 1987 law that allowed public support for the practice and a 2001 law allowing for the dispersion of ashes into the environment. Although there is no central record for cremations, the researchers collected data from associations of crematoriums and other unofficial sources.

They found a significant increase in the practice, growing by eight percent each year since 2001. The authors controlled for poor economic conditions in Italy (since cremation is less expensive than burial) and still found cremation becoming more widespread, although the practice is resisted more in the more religious southern regions of the country. Breschi, Ruiu and Francini conclude that the growth of cremation can be associated with the lifting of taboos on same-sex unions, out-of-wedlock births, and civil marriages, as they are all related to the expansion of individual preferences and economic incentives over the “moral values expressed by religious authorities.”



ARTICLES

Uruguay's secularism yielding to public religious expression and pluralism

Uruguay is slowly becoming more accommodating to the expression of religion in the public sphere after years of strict separation between the state and public religious expression, according to a new study by Nestor Da Costa in the journal *Social Compass* (online in August). secularism was traditionally close to the French *laïcité* model of church-state separation, which asserted strict control of church, particularly Catholic, public expression. Since the 1980s and 1990s, there has been a movement of non-Catholic faiths into the public sphere, as seen in the visibility of Afro-Brazilian religions (a statue of the goddess Iemanjá was allowed) and of Pentecostalism through its media presence, as well as in more generic religious expression in popular culture. Marian Catholic groups have been allowed to use the media, although the Catholic Church continues to face uphill battles in maintaining a public presence.

In 2017, the Church's request to install a statue of the Virgin Mary was turned down by the government. An earlier statue of Pope John Paul II and a cross commemorating his visit to Uruguay

were accepted, though not without protest and divisions. In 2016, Uruguay's Catholics, at the suggestion of its cardinal, displayed seasonal posters depicting a nativity scene and a mention of Jesus in their windows and balconies, which also drew controversy over whether such actions violated the society's secularism. When President Tabaré Vázquez displayed such a poster from his home,



there was criticism that the country's leader had violated state secularism. Da Costa concludes that there are "small movements toward accepting religion in public space ... [and that] Uruguayan people tend to exhibit searches for transcendence in more visible ways (and less privately) than they did decades ago." Diversity is "becoming increasingly valued in personal expression," which leads to a reluctance to publicly endorse a single religion.

(*Social Compass*, <http://journals.sagepub.com/home/scp>)

Abortion emerges as contentious issue in Catholic countries

Abortion has become a contentious political issue in the Latin American countries of Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, even though more as a subject of debate than a change in policy. Writing on the news site *Vox* (August 9), Amy Erica Smith argues that the new attention to abortion is less a sign of secularization in these societies than it is a reflection of the growth of social movements and religious competition. In recent months, Argentina narrowly defeated a bill that would have legalized abortion up to 14 weeks, while Chile's legislature legalized abortion in limited cases and Brazil has held hearings on the possibility of decriminalizing the practice. While the Catholic country of Ireland may have recently liberalized its abortion policy under a new wave of secularization, this is not the case with these Latin American nations, where the proportion of people who say that "religion is very important" to them has gone up in the past decade in the AmericasBarometer surveys in Brazil and Argentina. Trust in the Catholic Church has also risen in Argentina.

Smith writes that the emergence of waves of social movements in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile has been facilitated by new communication technologies. "The abortion debate, then, might be a sign not of the decline of religious conservatism, but of the increasing sophistication of leftist

movements.” She also ties the new debate to the sensitivity of clergy to religious competition and the threat of membership loss, which she has found to be characteristic of Brazilian clergy. “When reminded (i.e., primed) that they face these challenges, ... they give lower priority to topics such as ‘God’s wrath’



and the need for chastity, apparently in an attempt to keep the faithful in the pews.” Smith concludes that “If some Catholic clergy deliberately deemphasize abortion, there is no need for citizens to reject church teachings. And indeed, observers have noted the church’s reticence to speak out in the abortion debate in both Argentina and Ireland.”

Muslim and Buddhist scouts in France find common cause

Buddhist scouting is the most recent addition to scouting organizations in France, where they were helped by French Muslim scouts in launching their organization, reports the French newsletter *LaiCités* (August). Alongside French Catholic scouts (of various shades), Protestant scouts and secular scouts, they are part of a lively and growing interest in scouting in France, writes Thomas Séchier (*France Inter*, July 23). Buddhist scouting has been active in a number of countries and is known for its strong environmental thrust. The World Buddhist Scout Brotherhood obtained consultative status with the World Scout Committee in 2009 and includes groups in Bhutan, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the United Kingdom. Established in 1989, the International Union of Muslim Scouts also enjoys the same status. The French Buddhist scout organization did not result from an initiative by such international Buddhist organizations, however, but was the unexpected result of interfaith dialogue between Sufi Muslims and Buddhists. At a meeting, the leader of the Alawiya Sufi brotherhood, Cheikh Khaled Bentounes, asked how many in the audience had been scouts, and seeing that a number of participants had had such experiences, he suggested to them to start a Buddhist scouting organization, which was then launched in 2009.

Cheikh Bentounes had already been instrumental in encouraging the launching of the Muslim Scouts of France in the early 1990s. The effort was first viewed by mosques with some suspicion as a possible “competitor.” Today, mosque leaders understand that scouting is not a substitute for mosque attendance. There seems recently to be a revival of interest in Muslim scouting in



France, although the group has experienced some difficulties in finding cadres. French Buddhist scouts put a strong emphasis on respect for the environment and consumption of local products. This is reflected in the very name they are using, the “Eclaireurs de la Nature” (Nature Scouts). While the founders are all Buddhists, the spiritual orientation of the Nature Scouts is based on “mindfulness,” i.e., a secularized approach toward Buddhist meditation. *LaiCités* quotes their chairman, Emmanuel Buu, as saying that “we are Buddhist in our hearts, but French society does not need rites.” This explains why they have mostly attracted young people coming from families interested in alternative lifestyles, although their goal is now to integrate participants coming from Asian Buddhist communities in France as well. The relations between Muslim and Buddhist French scouts are continuing. In 2015, they had a joint, interreligious summer camp on the grounds of a Tibetan Buddhist community. Whatever their religious or non-religious persuasion, camps are more or less conducted in a similar way across scouting organizations, as a participant quoted by Séchier observed.

(*LaiCités: Lettre Pédagogique des Faits Religieux*, <https://laicites.info/>)

Christian activity aimed at North Korea shifts with American policy

Christian activity directed at North Korea is continuing despite sanctions and travel bans, even if such efforts are changing their focus from evangelism to social service, according to political scientist Joseph Yee. In a paper presented at the Association for the Sociology of Religion, the researcher reported that from 1985 to 2012 there were 480 foreign Christian-related organizations in North Korea. Since 2010, when sanctions were imposed on the country, foreign secular organizations declined while Christian ones increased. This continued until 2017, when travel bans were introduced and many Christian activities were curtailed. Western Christian activity has since been replaced with Christian leaders writing and engaging in “public discourse” about North Korea from outside its borders. Some of this public discourse, as in the case of some conservative South

Korean churches, may demonize North Korea. Such groups may take a conspiratorial approach, even linking North Korean communism with gay rights activism and homosexuality. But Western Christians have also taken a more conciliatory posture toward North Korea, perhaps reflecting the recent talk of peace by President Trump. In 2018, a prayer conference in Washington, DC sought to encourage policy makers to stress engagement with North Korea rather than treating the nation as a threat. Such an effort may have been a success, according to Yee, as indicated by such a prominent evangelical figure as Franklin Graham talking about seeking peace with North Korea.



Home schooling adopted by Christians in mainland China

“Since the beginning of the 2000s, a kind of home schooling providing children with Christian education has emerged in the big cities [of China], such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou,” writes Xiaoming Sheng (University of Cambridge) in an article published in the *British Journal of Religious Education* (online in June). The scarcity of research on this topic is not surprising, since practicing home schooling is illegal in Communist Party-ruled China. Sheng’s observations are based on in-depth qualitative research. Some parents had studied in the U.S. or the UK and converted to Christianity during their stay. After returning to China, they became the initial adopters of home schooling due to their strong religious beliefs as well as their disappointment with the Chinese educational system, with its emphasis on performance only and not on the development of the personality of the children—who often had started receiving education abroad and could not adjust to the Chinese system. Home schooling then spread through church networks, at the very time that Chinese parents had started looking for educational diversity.

There is always a correlation of home schooling practice with the parents’ religious beliefs. Transmission of religious values and norms appears to be the key motivation for some, while pedagogic factors are important for other people. Parents feel that home schooling prepares their children best, including for higher education abroad. The article describes different types of motivations and approaches, ranging from highly educated people with a foreign experience who

import home schooling material from the U.S., to people who want to teach Christianity to their children or want to maximize their prospects. Before the Communist takeover, Christian schools had played an important role in China, challenging the traditional education system and creating some of the best schools in the country. While there is no direct legacy of this vanished educational system that was suppressed by the Communist authorities, Christian home schoolers mention it as a way to remind people how Christianity goes along with educational excellence. No statistical data can be provided with certainty, due to the clandestine nature of home schooling, but the author estimates that there may currently be some 5,000 children who are home schooled in the country. A majority of the parents are middle class and have a good educational background, and the mother is usually the teacher.

(*British Journal of Religious Education*, <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cbre20/current>)



Imagined Judaism popular in South Korea, a country without Jews

Examining the paradox of a country where book-vending machines sell Korean versions of the Talmud and documentaries on Judaism are broadcast on television, at the same time that the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) has found South Korea to be one of the most anti-Semitic countries in the world although there are not more than 100 Jewish residents, Christopher L. Schilling pays attention to the fascination of Koreans for “Jewish education” in an article published in *Modern Judaism* (May). Many people have a copy of the Talmud at home, and some schools organize “Talmudic debates” while having no intent of converting their pupils to Judaism. Rather, they are looking for the secret of success that is associated with Jews. The “Talmud” owned by many

Korean households is no more than a few dozen pages long, compared with the thick volumes of the original. Many versions were the product of Rabbi Marvin Tokayer, who successfully published in Japan—and subsequently in other East Asian countries—“the Talmud” and other popular short books on various aspects of Judaism. Having no knowledge of local languages, Tokayer depended on translators and heavily commercialized Judaism, laying the ground for all kinds of stereotypes about Jews. Other publishers followed with similar publications. Searching “Talmud” in the National Digital Library of Korea, more than 800 different books appear, half of them children’s books. “Many Koreans seem to believe that reading those books will somehow improve their children’s IQ, and the very popular subgenre of the ‘pre-natal Talmud’ indicates that it supposedly supports brain development in the womb.”


While this interest delights the current Chabad rabbi in Seoul, Schilling is less enthusiastic. According to him, this has little to do with a love for Judaism, but rather with an interest in tools for improving Koreans’ own achievements. They hope to find the secret technique that has supposedly allowed Jews to prosper. Their fascination is primarily one with “Jewish success, power, and wealth,” thus spreading stereotypes. Consequently, it should not be a surprise that a 2014 ADL survey shows that more than half of South Koreans think that Jews have too much power and influence. Admiration may be part of that sentiment, but it has the potential to justify antisemitism too. Most highly educated students in South Korea fail to get jobs matching their level of education, Schilling concludes, and their frustration might well turn some of them into critics of unfulfilled promises of the “Talmud” and “Jewish education.”

(Modern Judaism: A Journal of Jewish Ideas and Experience, <https://academic.oup.com/mj>)




Findings & Footnotes

■ The new book *Religion and the Social Sciences* (Templeton Foundation Press, \$24.47) brings together contributors to account for the place of religion in their respective disciplines—from criminology and family psychology to outliers like epidemiology and gerontology (although the latter discipline has dealt with religious topics for over a century). Editor Jeff Levin of Baylor University writes that while sociology is the most active field in researching religious subjects, writing and research on religion has grown in most disciplines. But until recently, those doing research in these fields tended to be a “beleaguered lot,” often bringing these scholars together to make common cause. In his chapter on political science, Anthony Gill writes that there has been a “great awakening” in the field of political science since 2001 and the growth of religious terrorism. He notes that not only do many political scientists recognize that believers may bring their values to bear on political actions, but that “now we are open to approaches that see religious actors and organizations influenced by a whole host of incentive structures, many of which have commonalities with other political phenomena....”




Much of the recent growth in religious research in social science has taken place in economics, but Charles North notes that much more work needs to be done on the theoretical level. Along with several chapters on the growing body of research showing correlations between religious faith and physical, psychological, and family health and wellbeing, as well as the preventative role faith-based efforts seem to play regarding criminal behavior, Levin concludes the book with an overview of the new field of the epidemiology of religion. This study of population-wide patterns and causes of health and mortality has focused more on the preventative roles of religion and less on the clinical outcomes, but Levin writes that approaches that also include populations suffering from particular health challenges, as well as ones that study more diverse religious groups (other than Christian), represent the next frontier of this discipline.

■ Most of the current issue of the journal *Religion, State, and Society* (46:3) is devoted to religion and the rise of populism. Noting how religion has been neglected in the burgeoning field of populism studies, editors Daniel Nilsson DeHanas and Marat Shterin write that populism carries implicit religious themes, most notably the upholding of the “sacred” value of “the people.” But most of the contributions focus on the more explicit religious elements of populist movements. Greg Smith and Linda Woodhead look at the relation of British churches to the Brexit cause. While many practicing Anglicans gave support to Brexit, an unexpected finding was that evangelicals were far less supportive. They write that the middle class and internationalist outlook of British evangelicals distinguishes them from their populist counterparts in the U.S. But they also argue that the Anglican support of Brexit was not populist in the way that many Americans supported



Trump; “Brexit-supporting Anglicans defend liberal democracy against EU incursions and have no leader, party or movement. The only feature of populism they share is a defense of their ethno-religious identity and heritage against elites whom they believe to be indifferent or hostile to them.” Other articles include an ethnographic account of a “white supremacist” family of Trump supporters in Arizona and studies of populist-religious connections in Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Greece, though in the latter case, Orthodox religiosity negatively correlates with far-right sympathy. For more information on this issue, visit: <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/crss20/current>

■ *The Future of Mainline Protestantism in America* (Columbia University Press, \$30), edited by James Hudnut-Beumler and Mark Silk, at first resembles several books appearing every few years and attempting to chart the future of this liberal wing of Christianity, begging the question of what more can be forecasted about mainline Christianity. The book does hit on the familiar themes of decline both in numbers and social prestige, but the editors suggest larger trends, such as the growth of the unaffiliated, shifts in immigration, the megachurch phenomenon, and new configurations and divisions among Protestant Christians, that complicate the picture of a steadily declining segment of Christianity. The most provocative thesis in the book is in Hudnut-Beumler’s chapter on the “Quakerization of Mainline Protestantism,” where the author argues that the fragmentation and loss of social status and influence of mainline denominations is similar to the situation of the Quakers in the Middle Atlantic states of the U.S. during earlier centuries.



Like the Quakers, mainline Protestants may still maintain symbolic influence, and their colleges and other institutions may carry some weight, but they will become known mainly for their past teachings and traditions rather than for their current expressions and activism, according to Hudnut-Beumler. Other trends and forecasts that he discusses can also be related to the Quakers, including the greying of mainline churches and the growing tilt of mainline denominations—at least demographically and on a congregational basis—toward evangelicals (evangelical Quakers now far outnumber liberal “unprogrammed” Quakers).

■ Sriya Iyer’s new book *The Economics of Religion in India* (Harvard University Press, \$49.95) shows how Indian society is a particularly fertile ground to understand religion from an economic perspective. Iyer, a Cambridge University economist, argues that the growth in religious social service provisioning, faith-based schooling, such as the vast network of madrasas, and vigorous competition between temples and gurus all lend themselves to market dynamics to a greater extent than in the more secular West. She bases much of the book on her 2010 India Religion Survey, the first large-scale economic survey of religious institutions in India (which was reported on in **RW** from conference presentations Iyer made), showing that the competition between different religious social service providers (each providing distinct services, such as education and childcare) has increased the level of such services since the Indian economy was

liberalized in the 1990s and is substituting for the lack of state provisioning. This public involvement can result in greater religious radicalism and liberalism over time.

Iyer also focuses on India's socio-economic inequalities and how religion reflects these dynamics; for instance, even as Hindu and Muslim birthrates may well converge over time, educational and economic levels among the latter remain lower, as does their access to credit. A later chapter returns to the issue of competition and how Indian religions market themselves and engage in innovation. But Iyer concludes that government intervention may be necessary to prevent radicalism: "better state-provided public services now can minimize religious conflict in the future...[even if] religious organizations may then have a very positive role to play in economic development..."

