While it has been widely noted, often by theologians and other religious leaders, that the “new atheism” has fallen out of favor, no longer drawing the large following that it had in the early 2000s, more academic researchers are now weighing in on this noticeable shift. The new atheism was marked by its emphasis on science and use of celebrities, such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, in making the case for unbelief in the wake of September 11 and the growth of non-affiliation. In the journal Politics and Religion (online in May), Steve Kettell (University of Warwick) traces how the movement followed a cycle that social movements often experience, starting with a phase of emergence and coalescence marked by new structural opportunities and the deployment of considerable resources, including an ambiguous “atheist” label that provided the movement with a “big tent” that could include non-theist participants of various political orientations.
Kettell writes that while new atheists’ use of the “atheist” label as an “empty signifier” allowed for a wide interpretation and sense of belonging, it also facilitated the eventual fragmentation of the movement. While the new atheists utilized a strategy borrowed from the LGBTQ movement of calling atheists to “come out of the closet,” its foray into identity politics also signaled later problems. After 2010, two rival groups of atheists increasingly were at odds, one libertarian and conservative, defending freedom of speech and intellectual debate, and the other more progressive, promoting inclusivity and social justice. Added to the brewing divide were charges that atheist groups did not represent the interests of women and other minorities, highlighted by scandals and accusations against atheist leaders, such as David Silverman of American Atheists, who was fired amidst charges of sexual harassment.
While others have covered these conflicts [including RW’s editor, with Christopher Smith], Kettell argues that they mirrored the increased polarization and culture wars in society, especially during the first Trump administration, and resulted in an identity and a movement that was too weak for atheists to rally around. By this time, both the progressives and the libertarian-conservatives were accusing each other of damaging the movement’s integrity and selling out to ideologies, either of the “woke” left or the alt-right, and both sides found their closest allies outside of atheism. These divergent views “exposed clear differences in the core values and the strategic orientation of its members,” with Kettell concluding that the atheist movement is fractured “beyond repair.”
(Politics and Religion, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-religion/article/whatever-happened-to-new-atheism-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-atheist-movement/03688167041AC608385038786679F664)
