CURRENT RESEARCH

The report also included discrimination against Christians in public life and the workplace, such as Christian politicians facing discrimination and being forced to choose between their political vocation and their faith. This has led to increasing self-censorship among Christians. The reason why these findings receive less attention than similar reports on violations against Muslims and other minorities, especially against Jews, is that those attacks are more widespread in the West, especially since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas assault on Israel and the subsequent and ongoing Israeli military strikes in Gaza. But Marshall adds that another factor is the “outdated—but persistent—belief in much of our media that Christianity is largely Western and white and thus more likely to be an oppressor than oppressed. Hence, the issue of the persecution of Christians is seen as a ‘right-wing’ concern. This is often more an implicit attitude rather than an explicit belief, but the result is the same.”

(Religion Unplugged, https://religionunplugged.com/news/2024/11/19/in-time-for-red-wednesday-new-report-details-christian-persecution-worldwide)

Within Mahayana Buddhism, Soka Gakkai (240 local centers), Zen, and Shin Buddhism are the most common schools. Within Vajrayana, the most numerous Tibetan school is Kagyu (about 118 groups), followed by Nyingma (about 89 groups). The New Kadampa Tradition has established about 55 centers in Latin America. The Gelug school is represented by about 44 centers. The study underlines the crucial role played by Asian immigration in the development and establishment of Buddhist institutions in Latin America. Japanese immigration has had the most profound impact, while Chinese and Korean communities have contributed less but have still established notable centers. On the other hand, the role of converts, or non-Asian Buddhists, in the growth and diversification of Buddhism in Latin America is also recognized. Converts have contributed to the establishment of various Buddhist institutions, particularly in countries with smaller Asian immigrant populations.

Current entrants tend to have higher levels of education, with 62 percent having completed more than three years of university. Most have significant work experience, with 73 percent having worked before entering the monastery. In general, traditional local recruitment through parish connections has declined. The circle of recruitment has widened, with more people joining monastic communities far from their homes. Some candidates deliberately choose distant monasteries to make a clear break with their previous lives. There has been a “transition from vocations of continuity, often associated with primary socialization in a religious institution, to vocations of rupture.” The Internet and social media have become primary means of initial contact. Monasteries maintain an online presence, sharing information and answering questions about their way of life, while trying to avoid explicit recruitment marketing. In the past, most people entered monastic life in their late teens or early 20s. As the age of entry into this life increases, so does the accumulation of experience as an autonomous adult. However, “entering the monastery requires giving up certain forms of autonomy in favor of a way of life defined by the rule,” Jonveaux writes. Another challenge is the need for individualized training. In the past, when there were more vocations, it was common for novices to be trained in groups. However, the decline in vocations has made this more difficult, resulting in many monastic communities offering individual training, which can be challenging for both the novice and the novice director. The future of monastic life may depend on successfully managing these transitions while preserving authentic religious experience.

(Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions, https://journals.openedition.org/assr/)

A study of congregations in Switzerland finds both a continuing pattern of secularization and increasing openness and acceptance of homosexuality and the role of women in church leadership. The study, conducted by researchers from the University of Fribourg and the Strasbourg and Basel faculties of Theology, and reported in Evangelical Focus (November 29), found that the total number of local religious groups during the period under review fell from 6,341 in 2008 to 5,883 in 2022, a decrease of 7.2 percent. Participation in religious events fell from 894,000 (2008) to 824,000 (2022). The average age of leaders and regular participants also increased (by three years) during this time. Roman Catholics and Reformed Protestant churches lost the most members, while evangelicals and charismatics showed more fluctuation. In addition to secularization and aging, the study found that the percentage of local religious groups accepting homosexual people as full members of the community rose from 63 percent in 2008 to 75 percent in 2022. “The growing acceptance of homosexual people is particularly evident in the Roman Catholic, Protestant-conservative and Muslim traditions,” the researchers write. The share of groups showing greater openness to women in leadership roles has grown from 47 percent to 54 percent, with 15.2 percent actually being led by a woman (from 12.4 percent in 2008). This increase has been seen most strongly in Reformed, classical evangelical, and Buddhist groups, while “conservative evangelical,” Orthodox, Muslim and Hindu Sikh groups have “changed little or negatively.”

(Evangelical Focus, https://evangelicalfocus.com/europe/29199/secularisation-and-age-of-religious-leaders-grows-in-switzerland)

Saint Nikolaos Holy Orthodox Church, Parikia, Paros, Greece (© 2023 Warren LeMay | Flickr).

(EUREL, https://www.eurel.org)

While denouncing sectarianism as divisive, most respondents spoke of religiosity as socially bonding and integrative. They were also opposed to the idea that Lebanon’s struggles were due to religion; they more often cited political divisions and structural issues as being responsible for these conflicts. While Renne’s sample of respondents may not be representative, she cited recent survey research showing a marked increase in self-reported religiosity in Lebanon, especially engagement in religious practices, while showing a decrease in support of religion as an identity. This may suggest that “youth may be looking for something within religiosity that is not only different from sectarianism, but actually runs counter to the logic and aims of ‘sectarianism’ in their minds.”

(Politics and Religion, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-religion)

    Source: Ceng Ismail | pexels.com.

Moreover, during the AKP’s rule, not only did pious Sunnis, constituting a large share of Turkey’s population, improve their likelihood of being employed in public-sector jobs, but the smaller group of highly religious Sunnis (only 9.3 percent of the population) also improved their employment opportunities in the public sector compared to others, including other pious Sunnis. The researchers note that their findings were likely driven by the lifting of the headscarf ban in public employment as well as AKP’s strategic use of public employment and resources to reward like-minded groups in both the public and private spheres. They add that, “whether the increase in pious Sunni public sector employment resulted from favoritism in recruitment, an increase in pious Sunnis’ willingness to apply for public sector jobs, or both cannot be determined using our data. However, our results highlight the important role of religious identity in public employment.”

(Public Choice, https://link.springer.com/journal/11127)