The Great Council and Orthodox disunity

The Great Council of the Eastern Orthodox churches has come and gone without much fanfare, let alone media headlines, but the week-long gathering of prelates from around the world in late June did reveal fissures and fault lines that will shape the Orthodox future. The Great Council, held in Greece and planned for over a century, had not been previously held for a thousand years due to the schism between Catholicism and Orthodoxy and subsequent social and political upheavals and obstacles to Orthodox unity. For many observers, the refusal of several bishops (from the Russian, Georgian, Bulgarian, and Antiochian churches) to attend the council became part of a plot line involving rivalry, competition, and the growth of fundamentalism and traditionalism in world Orthodoxy. At a call-in conference run by the Council of Foreign Relations, political scientist Elizabeth Prodromou said the narrative about rivalry for dominance in the Orthodox world between the Ecumenical Patriarch, historically the “first among equals” in Orthodox leadership, and the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church led the media coverage of the event, particularly over the concern about whether the former would exercise pope-like authority.

Prodromou says this narrative was first “laid out by the Moscow Patriarchate and more specifically the Putin government…. That the church has been able to exercise leverage over the other three who didn’t come [is] also very much related to Russia’s geopolitical objectives in Europe and Eurasia…. That the council spoke out forcefully against religious nationalism did not please the Russian state, but the Russian church is limited in maneuvering within such an authoritarian polity, she adds. The council showed the Orthodox churches in Cyprus and Albania among the most open on a range of issues, particularly the relation of Orthodoxy and democracy. In fact, it was the bishop of Cyprus who said at the close of the council that the “single greatest challenge” to unity and progress within the Orthodox Church is “fundamentalism.” Several other church leaders and observers have targeted Orthodox fundamentalism as hampering the work of the recent council.

RW attended a conference at Fordham University in New York in late June that specifically sought to define Orthodox fundamentalism and come up with a response to the phenomenon. The
dilemmas of defining and applying the elusive concept of fundamentalism to Orthodox churches marked many of the presentations.

Edith Humphrey of Pittsburgh Theological Seminary said that while the early fundamentalist Protestant movement tried to condense the basic tenets of Christianity and bring Christians together, Orthodox fundamentalists are “maximalists,” in that they press for the preservation and restoration of a full range of traditions and teachings throughout church history. “I’m unconvinced of the use of ‘fundamentalism’ for Catholicism and Orthodoxy,” she added. She cited the 2009 statement “A Confession Against Ecumenism,” drawn up by a group of Greek clergy and monks, as well as broader advocacy of the old church calendar, re-baptism of converts, sexual abstinence for women during menstruation, and the teaching on “toll houses” (which holds that believers have to face purgatorial trials by demons after death), as characterizing the views of such traditionalists or “tradox,” as she called them. Father Oliver Hebel, an Orthodox military chaplain, argued for the term “restorationists” rather than fundamentalists in that such Orthodox believers seek to restore the ancient church as a bulwark against the modern world and church. He noted that there is a “convert syndrome” in such a movement, with many ex-evangelicals likely to embrace such a stance, although many such restorationists are also cradle church members. Nadieszda Kizenko of the State University of New York presented a case study on the revival of traditional practices of confession among the Russian Orthodox as a sign of such fundamentalist growth, although she too was hesitant to use the term.

Since the fall of communism, confession has become even more rigorous than in the pre-1917 period (even if practiced on a much smaller scale), including such practices as writing one’s confession as a preparation for the rite, in some cases having a “spiritual father” (rather than an ordinary parish priest) to hear one’s confession, and a stronger connection being made between confession and receiving the Eucharist, according to Kizenko. Nikolaos Asproulis of the Volos Academy for Theological Studies in Greece was more outspoken in identifying fundamentalism in the Greek Orthodox Church. He identified Orthodox theological fundamentalism as embraced by only about 4 percent of members and led by Greek monks on Mount Athos—although present in such lay movements as Zoe. This camp stresses the infallibility of church fathers, apocalyptic language (such as referring to the “purified” versus outsiders), the importance of spiritual fathers, and a strong critique against ecumenism and religious dialogue. A much larger ethno-religious fundamentalism links Orthodox identity with Greek nationalism—as represented by the Greek Orthodox Salvation Movement—and is concerned mainly about ethnic continuity and survival and agitated over the immigration crisis and the growth of religious pluralism in Greece.

ARTICLES:

**The secularization of Quinceanera?**

Quinceanera, the coming of age ceremony for 15-year-old Latina girls in the U.S., is becoming more secular, coming to resemble Jewish bat mitzvah ceremonies, reports the *New York Times* (June 5). Traditionally, the quinceanera combined a birthday party with a rite-of-passage into womanhood for teenage Latinas, but it also had strong religious overtones, including a Mass with the celebrations based within a church hall, with the idea of showcasing the girl’s purity and readiness for marriage. Over the years, the ceremony has become more lavish, bringing in event planners, D.J.s, and makeup artists and spawning fashion expos, and today “many girls are incorporating decidedly secular and non-Latino elements…” into these events, writes Marybel Gonzalez. The extravagant nature of quinceanera parties, with their high costs, has raised criticisms that the celebrations clash with the church, with one New York parish cutting back holding such Masses. But the celebrations have a dual role: for recent immigrants, they create an impression of affluence, while for second- and third-generation Americans, they are a way to reclaim lost traditions, according to Rachel Gonzalez-Martin of the University of Texas at Austin.

**Amish church planting for converts?**

New Amish groups are being established in non-traditional ways outside of the faith’s heartland in Pennsylvania and the Midwest, according to an article in the *Washington Post* (June 25). Two small South American settlements were both founded last fall after longstanding Mennonite communities in those countries reached out to North American Amish to explore affiliation, according to Steven Nolt, a researcher on Anabaptist and Mennonite groups. In recent years, their members in Bolivia and Argentina have faced financial problems and isolation, so they wrote to an Amish publisher in Canada and eventually got in touch with a New Order Amish group in Ohio that permits its members, under certain circumstances, to make airplane trips.

After ministers with the Ohio Amish visited these South American inquirers, they sent two families to settle the area and plant communities the Mennonites can join. The Associated Press-based
article points out that North American Amish generally do not proselytize or do mission work. The Bolivian community, known as Colonia Naranjita, is about 75 miles southwest of Santa Cruz, while the settlement in rural northwestern Argentina is located east of Catamarca. “This is kind of a new and different thing and illustrates (an) unusually—even among the New Order Amish—Amish approach to taking in new members,” Nolt said. He added that Mennonite men in those areas have begun to grow Amish-type beards, and an Ohio Amish woman has made bonnet head coverings for the women.

**Steeper costs in exiting new religious movements for second-generation**

First- and second-generation members of new religious movements (NRMs) experience similar conflicts when they leave these groups, although the latter find it much more difficult to exit and build new lives, according to a study in the *Journal of Religion & Society* (Vol. 18, 2016). Most of the information on ex-members of NRMs has focused on those who joined or were recruited voluntarily, but researchers Nicole Shoenberger and Chris Grayburn look at ex-members born into these new religions through interviews and find a somewhat different pattern. Unlike their parents’ generation, breaking family ties (especially parental ones) to leave NRMs is more difficult, with many delaying such exits to avoid such a disruption. “Many also felt as though there were more struggles in finding jobs, dating and going to college,” Shoenberger and Grayburn write. But the second-generation ex-members did not show a high rate of using exit counselors (or deprogrammers), with most retaining faithfulness to a religion (if not to the movement they left).

CURRENT RESEARCH

● About 40 million of the 200 billion messages sent on Twitter last year consisted of Bible verses, with a high percentage of senders being either an elite group of religious leaders or “bots,” programs designed to create their own tweets, according to Christianity Today (June). The top two Bible passages are the favorites of evangelicals: Philippians 4:13 (“I can do all things through Christ…”) and John 3:16 (“For God so loved the world…”). About a half million of these tweets came from just five pastors and celebrities, such as John Piper, Joyce Meyer, Tim Tebow, and Franklin Graham. About 20 million of the 40 million passages shared on Twitter came from “Bible spam accounts that do nothing but tweet Bible verses all day,” said Stephen Smith of OpenBible.info, who crunched the data.

(Christianity Today, 465 Gundersen Dr., Carol Stream, IL 60188)

● The controversial case of an atheist minister fighting to stay in the United Church of Canada has caused some Canadians to suspect there are other non-theists among United Church clergy, but it seems this case is more of an isolated one, according to a survey reported in the Vancouver Sun (June 9). The atheist clergywoman Gretta Vosper has frequently said that at least 50 percent of the clergy in the United Church “don’t believe in a theistic, supernatural God.” United Church minister Richard Bott conducted an actual survey among 1,353 United Church ministry personnel who took part. “While how they believe and what they believe is wide and varied, almost 95 percent of the United Church ministers who responded to the online survey were clear—they do believe in God,” Bott says.

In addition, his survey found that “a large number, almost 80 per cent, affirm belief in a ‘supernatural, theistic God.’” What is called “panentheism” was the most common view among active United Church of Canada clergy; 51 percent of active UC clergy who responded to the survey agreed with the panentheist statement “I believe in the existence of god/God, and that God/god is greater than the universe, includes and interpenetrates it.” Thirty-four percent of active UC clergy held to the classic theistic belief in God. Only 0.7 percent, or fewer than one in 100, were atheist; just 2.1
percent of active United Church clergy agreed with the statement “God is solely a metaphor for what is good in the human condition,” and 1.2 percent were agnostic.

- **Throughout the world, both government restrictions on religion and social hostilities involving religion dropped from 2013 to 2014 even though there has been a rise in religion-related terrorism,** reports Pew Research Center’s study on restrictions on religion. Of the 198 countries studied, 24 percent had high or very high levels of government restrictions in 2014, down from 28 percent in 2013. There was a similar decline in the share of countries with high or very high social hostilities involving religion, which decreased from 27 percent to 23 percent. This year is the second in a row that the number of countries with this level of religious restrictions has dropped, after three years of steady growth. These declines in countries with high restrictions or hostilities, though modest, took place despite a clear increase in the number of countries where religion-related terrorist activities have taken place. Of the nearly 200 countries and territories included in the study, 82 (41%) had religion-related terrorist activities in 2014, up from 73 (37%) in 2013. Religion-based terrorism could include activities limited to recruitment or fundraising, although in 60 countries, religion-related terrorism led to injuries or deaths, including at least 50 casualties in each of 28 countries.

*(The Pew study can be downloaded at http://www.pewforum.org/2016/06/23/trends-in-global-restrictions-on-religion/)*

A new survey conducted by St. Mary’s University, Twickenham, London, shows that 48.5 percent of people in Britain follow no religion at all. Some 44 percent report themselves as Christian, and about 8 percent follow other religions, including Islam. The report, which focused on Catholics in Britain, shows that while on any given Sunday there are more Catholics in church than members of other Christian groups, the figures still do not represent more than a small proportion of those who should be there by affiliation. Among the main Christian
denominations, Catholics have the strongest retention rate, with 55.8 percent of cradle Catholics identifying as Catholic. But Catholics also have the weakest conversion rate, with only 7.7 percent of current Catholics not having been brought up in the faith. The large majority of all converts to Christianity have already been raised in different Christian traditions.

(This study can be downloaded at http://www.stmarys.ac.uk/benedict-xvi/contemporary-catholicism.htm)

● In one of the first studies on the relationship between religion and earned income in a developing country, it is found that religious denominational affiliation correlates with earnings in Ghana among women, with Spiritualists, Methodists, and Pentecostals in the higher ranges of earners. Sedefka Beck and Sara Gundersen of Valparaiso University, who published their study in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (online version, July), analyzed the fifth round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey and found that among women, Spiritualists have a 21 percent earnings differential, Methodists 15 percent higher, and Pentecostals 12 percent compared with mainline Protestants. Traditionalists have a 31 percent earned income disadvantage. Beck and Gundersen add that for Spiritualists, the middle deciles of the earning distribution drive the advantage, while high-income earners drive it for Pentecostals and Methodists. Men did not show these distinctions. The researchers conclude that the correlation between higher earned income and charismatic religions may suggest a direct link between prosperity teachings in these groups and higher realized incomes.

GENERAL ARTICLES:

Purse tightening on public funding of religion in Europe

The future of public funding or support of religion in Europe is likely to become increasingly linked with its potential for positive contributions to society, according to several articles in the inaugural issue of the new French-language journal on religion and law, the *Revue du Droit des Religions* (May). The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) allows public funding of religion, and differences in treatment toward religion can be accepted as long as they are not discriminatory, writes Gérard Gonzalez. The historical legacy as well as the special significance of a religious group are elements to be considered in judging a variety of practices from one country to another. What is not acceptable is to refuse to a specific religion benefits enjoyed by other religions, as, for instance, when Turkey was condemned for refusing to consider Alevi places of worship as such. The ECHR emphasizes that it is not their business to judge if a religious belief is legitimate or not.

While rooted in history, however, the various schemes of public funding of religions in European countries are based on foundations that are losing relevance, writes Francis Messner. While very diverse, three main types of funding situations can be identified. There are churches getting an income from movable and immovable property, such as the Church of England in the United Kingdom (without allowing direct funding of churches). In several countries, the state provides part or all of the income of established churches. In Belgium and Luxemburg, the salary of ministers is provided as a compensation for the seizing of properties at the time of the French Revolution (though it has also come to benefit some groups that were not yet present during that period); in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavian countries, various systems of so-called “church taxes” are provided by state services on behalf of established religious bodies. A third category of countries are those where there is in principle no public funding, such as France, Ireland, and the Netherlands (though there are still forms of funding in those countries, such as local authorities subsidizing the building of places of worship for minority religions to promote religious equality in the Netherlands).

Though public funding of religious groups is a legacy of past circumstances, it is getting more difficult for European public opinion to understand and accept, Messner writes. Increasingly, as can be observed in post-communist states or in dealing with new religious groups such as Muslims in Western Europe, authorities are willing to provide some support (such as supporting the training of religion teachers) in exchange for positive contributions of those religious groups to a harmonious social life.

Islamo-democrats and the ‘soft Islamicization’ of Central Asia

Even as terrorists from Central Asia have taken the spotlight for their recent part in the Islamic State’s attack in Istanbul in late June, the region is seeing the emergence of “Islamo-democrats” who are challenging the influence of political Islam. *The Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* (Vol. 36, No. 2) reports that the growth of political Islam, represented by such radical groups as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir, no longer controls the Islamic scene. Rather than seeking to create a Muslim society through applying Islamic teachings to every aspect of social life, such leaders as Tursunbai Bakir Uulu in Kyrgyzstan, Bekbolat Tleukhan in Kazakhstan, and Mohiddan Kabiri in Tajikistan “share a modest political agenda, while they publicly pronounce their commitment to the existing political order,” writes Emmanuel Karagiannis. The failure of Islamist groups to establish Islamic republics in Central Asia, with many of their members serving prison sentences for their insurgent activities, has made them less active in the region. Even though Hizb ut-Tahrir has remained active in most of Central Asia, the declining number of arrests of members suggests that the group is no longer expanding.

Karagiannis notes that the rise of the Islamo-democrats does not necessarily mean the same thing as Western-style secular democracies. Leaders such as Bakir Uulu and Kabiri propose a partial and “soft Islamicization” of their countries (including women wearing the hijab) through democratic means unlike the previous groups that confronted state authorities and ultimately mobilized Muslims for a universal caliphate. The Islamo-democrats are more likely to stress the importance of a homeland. Karagiannis notes that a major influence in the new Islamic actors in Central Asia has been Turkey and its Justice and Development Party (AKP), which seeks to reconcile social conservatism with a pro-business agenda. The AKP has sought to promote its version of Islam abroad, including Central Asia, and the governments of the region have sought to placate Turkey as a strategic ally.

*(Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjmm20/current)*
Findings & Footnotes

- *The Sectarianism of the Islamic State*, published last month by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, presents a thorough examination of the tangled roots of the ideologies and theologies that make up this unorthodox and lethal jihadist movement (whatever the secular motivations of its fighters). Hassan Hassan, author of the report, stresses that while the IS has a background in Wahhabism, a strict form of Islam, it is simplistic to blame any one ideology for the movement’s extremism. Especially interesting is the report’s section on how the IS relies on many clerics who may not support all its views but often are direct heirs of older movements, such as the Sahwa, which itself is a revolutionary variant of the Muslim Brotherhood. To download this report, visit http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy

- Technological devices aiding prayer, called “prayer machines,” are the subject of a special section in the journal *Material Religion* (March). Prayer machines can be any devices that enable religious adherents to acquire greater skill in the execution of prayer or that measure the practitioner’s physical and mental states while praying. A lead article chronicles the long history of such devices, from Buddhist prayer wheels to coin-operotive votive prayer candles to praying dolls, arguing that these machines helped sacralize the growing automation of everyday life. Today it is clearly Buddhism where such technology has flourished—especially in Japan—to include prayer wheels powered by solar energy, software with mantra chanting loops, and even a wallet with automated scripture-chanting chip that activates when opened. Another article looks at how strict Salafist Muslims have responded to a growth of technology-assisted prayer with rulings that range from approval to outright condemnation. For more information on this issue, visit http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rfmr20#.V3vPqaRTGM8
The July issue of the journal *International Sociology* is devoted to religion in cities of Asia. Co-editor Peter van der Veer argues in this issue, as elsewhere, that the relationship between the sacred and urban space is especially evident in Asia, though the subject remains off the agenda of urban sociologists and anthropologists (although geographers have been more receptive to this development). In the introduction to the issue, van der Veer and co-editor Daniel P. S. Goh write that the rapid urbanization of China has forced religions to adapt their practices to city life, but at the same time these believers create new innovations as they attempt to sacralize and take control of secular urban space vis-à-vis religious competitors and state management of religion.

The issue includes studies of urban protests in Hong Kong by religious groups against the Chinese state and consumer boycotts by Muslims against companies and the state in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. In the face of rapid Islamicization in Indonesia, an article by Goh shows how evangelical Christians use mega prayer assemblies to claim their own share of the public space and “express their aspirations for a cosmopolitan Indonesia.” Other articles focus on less confrontational struggles, as in the study of young Koreans adopting a new form of urban Buddhism in Seoul that appropriates the drive for self-realization and capitalist consumption. For more information on this issue, visit http://iss.sagepub.com/

While it may be the case that schism is more difficult and rarer in Roman Catholicism, as dissenters cannot easily replicate the papacy and other distinctive features of the church, that hasn’t stopped several groups from trying, according to the new book *The Other Catholics* (Columbia University Press, $29.95) by Julie Byrne. The independent Catholics the book investigates are a diverse lot, covering groups that broke off from Roman Catholicism in earlier periods, such as the Old Catholics and the Polish National Catholic Church, and more recent splits, including the Church of Antioch, the Ecumenical Catholic Church, and the Orthodox Church (the author concentrates on the left side of the spectrum rather than on the traditionalist right). Byrne holds that these groups, totaling about one million adherents at most, serve as laboratories of innovation to wider (or “big-body”) Catholicism as well as “black sheep” in the Catholic fold.

Focusing on the Church of Antioch, she clearly sees these churches’ openness to non-Christian sources (often based on esoteric teachings) as well as their support of women’s ordination and women bishops (though Antioch has several “conjugal” or married bishop couples) and gay rights as such innovations. Byrne devotes much of the book to profiling the bishops and other leaders of independent Catholic circles, tracing their journeys through Roman Catholicism and often more
heterodox paths with considerable syncretism involved. But Byrnes also finds independent Catholicism facing several hurdles—there is only a trickle of liberal, dissenting Catholics moving to these churches (even if they may cooperate with them), and Antioch and several other bodies have experienced infighting and serious splits. Byrne concludes the book with a survey she conducted among independent Catholic members, which, among other findings, shows high proportions of ex-Roman Catholics, whites, highly educated, and LGBT (almost 40 percent) in its ranks, with only about 5 percent of its clergy receiving either full- or part-time salaries from their churches.

Publishing books trying to understand or remedy the growing rate of religious non-affiliation has become a cottage industry. The recent book Choosing our Religion (Oxford University Press, $29.95) by Elizabeth Drescher, is one of the more in-depth treatments of the nones, with its ethnographic method having the advantage over survey research of allowing people to define themselves on a spectrum of quite religious to irreligious. Drescher notes how such “fuzziness” marks much of this disparate population, where even spiritual inclinations can vary on a day-to-basis and atheists sometimes report episodes of prayer. Since most of the subjects in the study, which also draws on focus groups, an online survey, and interviews of 219 people, are from Christian backgrounds, the author finds a pattern of ex-mainline nones drifting from their involvement gradually, with declining interest and motivation, while ex-evangelical nones leave with some anger toward their churches, and ex-Catholics exit the church feeling they were “hurt” by the institution.

Drescher spends a considerable amount of space discussing the sites and activities that nones view as spiritually meaningful, and not surprisingly such places or objects are not explicitly religious. Everyday life and relationships are the main places where nones find spiritual meaning rather than through institutional religious frames. But Drescher suggests that nones do in fact have “affiliations” of a sort that support their beliefs and values—though such connections are “more provisional and networked” than hierarchical and traditional. These connections could be friendship networks, intentional groups such as the Sunday Assembly for the atheist-minded, or concerts, comedy shows, or Oprah’s #SoulSunday on Twitter or Pinterest, a spiritual community based on her weekly television program. Drescher tends to view the nones as a positive development, believing that they are modeling a more cosmopolitan ethics of care and compassion (though based on the Christian parable of the Good Samaritan). She concludes that religious groups have little to lament from the growth of the nones—they are neither more nor less spiritual or moral than the affiliated—though they are not likely to return to traditional religious institutions. She adds that the nones’ “entanglement” with affiliated friends and family opens points for dialogue and interchange; already, institutional religions have taken on new forms and extended their reach into secular spaces (bars and schools) as they have sought to reach out to the nones.
The market for handbooks, textbooks, and introductions to all kinds of subjects continues to flourish. In this huge flow of production, one can notice additions to literature on new religious movements (NRMs) that are not merely collections of essays already published elsewhere but volumes with original content—and sometimes less usual topics as well. Interestingly, these volumes do not overlap but rather complement each other and thus probably all belong to any serious library on the topic. The earliest one, *The Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements* (Cambridge, 2012, $29.99), edited by Oliver Hammer and Mikael Rothstein, contained 18 chapters over 330 pages, covering both themes (among them a chapter on rituals in new religions) and a selection of movements (including an approach to Jihadism as a NRM). Two years later, George D. Chryssides and Benjamin E. Zeller edited *The Bloomsbury Companion to New Religious Movements* (Bloomsbury, 2014, $39.95) with a different and original concept: a mixture of standard size and shorter chapters (4–5 pages each)—a total of 31 chapters, plus 34 pages of concepts (such as ethics, peace, and syncretism) not dealt with elsewhere in the volume.

There are no chapters on individual movements in this volume, but rather themes, including a strong emphasis on research methods and problems regarding various subjects. The introduction traces the emergence of two key themes on NRMs: violence and the advent of the Internet. The editors also insist on the legitimacy of NRMs as a specific field of study despite questions asked about the possible perpetuation of an “unnatural distinction” between NRMs and other forms of religion—but NRMs do in fact differ from other religions, the editors argue. Another volume has now joined the list: *The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements, Volume II* (Oxford University Press, 2016, $150), edited by James R. Lewis and Inga Tøllefsen. The mention of “Volume II” is somewhat misleading; it is meant to distinguish this volume from an earlier one with the same title (2004) published by Oxford and edited by Lewis, but they are different volumes and not sequels. Other authors have been invited to write on topics approached in the previous volume—sometimes with young scholars as new contributors.

More than 500 pages long, the volume contains 37 chapters, divided in parts from social-scientific approaches to subfields of study; an entire section is devoted to controversy. No chapter is devoted to an individual group alone. A number of chapters deal with topics one would expect in such a volume, offering good, up-to-date overviews. Some chapters, however, approach topics one comes across less frequently in books on NRMs. For instance, Mikael Rothstein has a chapter on a subject that has rarely been approached in a comparative way: hagiography, “the narrative exaltation of sect leaders and heads of new religions.” Jessica Moberg suggests that material perspectives could offer new insights to the study of new religions. “One may, for instance, examine how dress codes and religious objects change over time” or how adherents relate to their history materially (e.g. Scientologists having replicas of L. R. Hubbard’s office in their centers). These examples show how a handbook or general volume can go beyond summarizing what scholars have previously done and offer new perspectives as well. What is absent from all three books is a chapter on the future of new religions.

In introducing *Jesuits and Globalization* (Georgetown University Press, $32.95), editors Thomas Banchoff and Jose Casanova write that the historical and contemporary experiences of the Society of Jesus can tell us as much about the process of globalization as about the Catholic religious order itself. Almost from the start of the religious order during the Counter-Reformation, the Jesuits claimed the world as
their mission field, and the first half of the book looks at how this expansion is fleshed out in history. There have been high and low points in Jesuit globalization; after the order’s expulsion from Europe in the 19th century, the order brought their Catholic international style to the far corners of the earth—with a mixed record of successes and failures—but they reversed course in the more nationalist 1920s and 1930s, only to revive their globalism after the Second Vatican Council.

The second part of the book takes up the Jesuit impact in the contemporary period, with engaging chapters on Latin America, Asia, and on such fields as education and immigration. The Jesuit tradition of establishing schools and universities fits well into the globalized world, especially as these institutions create international educational networks and exchanges. The Jesuit campaign for human rights and poverty alleviation in Asia and Latin America is undergirded with the idea of global human development, which has been increasingly recognized by development workers and the United Nations. Casanova’s concluding chapter argues that the Jesuits have been rediscovered by social scientists as a relevant global network that has been able to hold the local and the universal in tension, without exercising exclusive Westernization. Casanova adds, however, that the decrease of Jesuit presence and influence in the West and their growth in Africa and Asia puts them at the periphery rather than at the centers of globalization.

Published just in time for the Great Council that gathered Orthodox bishops in Crete last month (where it was distributed), the newest edition of the handbook of all Orthodox bishops around the world, Orthodoxia 2016-2017 (Aschendorff Verlag, 20 €), has also been made freely available online. Its editors note that this online version will allow them to update the directory continuously. Orthodoxia was first published in 1982 by the Ostkirchliches Institut Regensburg (Institute for Eastern Churches, located in Regensburg, Germany). It has now become a publication of the Institute for Ecumenical Studies at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, that also hosts the newly-launched online directory at www.orthodoxia.ch. Bishops are listed by church affiliation (such as the Orthodox Church of Albania, Patriarchate of Alexandria, etc.). In addition to name and address, essential information is also provided for each bishop, when available, such as birthdate, dates of ordination as deacon, priest, and bishop, academic grades, and successive appointments. In addition to Byzantine Orthodox Churches, the directory also includes Oriental Orthodox (i.e. Prechalcedonian) Churches (Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopian, Syriac) as well as the Assyrian Church of the East (so-called “Nestorian”).

It does not include Eastern Churches in union with Rome. Although the Macedonian Orthodox Church is currently not recognized by other Orthodox Churches due to its conflict with the Serbian Patriarchate, its bishops are included. Bishops of the two large Ukrainian Churches not in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate are listed in a single category at the end of the volume. A peculiarity of the handbook is that it is probably the only one on an historical communion of churches that is not published by that communion or by one of its constituents. The long-time compiler, Nikolaus Wyrwoll, is a Roman Catholic priest, and the new editors are Roman Catholics as well. The print version is similar in format and color to
the Pontifical Yearbook published by the Roman Catholic Church. The fact that non-Orthodox have made such a publication possible since 1982 may also be revealing of challenges faced by Orthodox churches in organizing themselves at a Pan-Orthodox level.

*Religion and Non-religion among Australian Aboriginal Peoples* (Routledge, $149) is an in-depth treatment of a topic that on first impression may seem marginal; why give non-religion equal billing with religion when studying the native population of Australia? But as editors James L. Cox and Adam Possamai note in the introductory chapter, the book is an outgrowth of the unusual findings in the 2011 Australian census concerning the increase of non-religion among Australian Aboriginal peoples; between 2006 and 2011, there was a 41 percent increase in the number of Aboriginal Australians in the “no religion” category, whereas for the whole Australian population, the increase was notably less (29.41 percent). As the rest of the chapters show, this trend doesn’t mean that a large part of the Aboriginal population has become atheists and agnostics. In fact, the number of people claiming to be part of Aboriginal Traditional Religion, as well as Islam and Buddhism, showed a marked increase during the same time that the “nones” were on the rise.

It is this hybrid and multiple-religious orientation, rather than a romanticized native religious identity, that the census has been unable to capture among Aborigines. The chapter uses data from Google searches to suggest that there is some growth in interest in non-religious views and beliefs among Aborigines, although the author is uncertain if it is “unbelief” in Western religion rather than beliefs in the mold of the “New Atheism” that is occurring. Other interesting chapters cover the way Christianity has been blended with elements of native aboriginal spirituality, such as the use of “songlines,” the importance of dreams in churches (ranging from Lutheran to Pentecostal) and secular life, and the persisting role that churches play in these indigenous communities even among those not claiming a strong religious identity.