Journalists and other observers seem to agree that religion in 2024 was more of the same from 2023—as seen in the slow-motion schism in the United Methodist Church and Israel’s war with Hamas and its repercussions for American Jews and Muslims. Even the Trump campaign and election were something of a replay of 2016 and 2020. But it’s also easy to tease out new developments that unfolded last year that will carry significant implications for 2025 and beyond, even if they draw on familiar themes. As in previous years, we cite last year’s issues of RW (and other publications) that have reported on these issues.
1) Trump’s election and campaign in 2024 were similar to previous years, but last year we saw a broadening of Trump’s appeal to religious conservatives in minority groups, including Latino, African American, and even Muslim and Hindu communities. Many observers and pundits have pointed out that the shift in minority and working-class support for Trump was due more to dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party and its nomination of Kamala Harris than an affinity with Trumpism. Nevertheless, Trump’s outreach to working-class ethnics included a religious dimension, being seen as friendlier to traditional values, such as on gender. Such a shift in working-class voting may be even more pronounced with a likely J.D. Vance run in 2028, which would include a more prominent moral-religious thrust. (November RW)
2) And yet the future of the religious right and even the more amorphous Christian nationalism, regardless of the Trump victory, was uncertain by the end of 2024. One clear indicator of a change afoot was the removal of the prolife plank in the Republican platform at the party’s national convention. Party operatives (and Trump himself) argued that this was a pragmatic move in the face of the Dobbs victory of 2018 and the subsequent loss of prolife measures at the state level. But other trends, most notably the secularizing forces among the younger generations—even among conservatives—and the growth of an anti-Christian and pagan elite in conservative circles, spell trouble for religious-right activism. Meanwhile, the religious left and even moderates put up much less organized religious resistance to Trumpism in 2024 than in 2016 and 2020 (though stringent immigration crackdowns may change that), suggesting diminishing fortunes for religious politics all around. (November RW)
3) Although the Synod on Synodality, concluded in October, disappointed those who had hoped for radical changes in the Roman Catholic Church, it was conceived as a step in an ongoing process of reform and has set the stage for potentially significant changes in the church’s governance and pastoral approach, emphasizing greater inclusivity, transparency, and lay participation. While acknowledging that in “a synodal Church, the authority of the bishop, of the episcopal college, and of the bishop of Rome in regard to decision-taking is inviolable,” several significant structural reforms were proposed for strengthening participatory bodies (pastoral councils and regular assemblies across all church levels) and for granting more authority to episcopal conferences. The final document emphasized that there are “no reasons to prevent women from taking on leadership roles in the Church,” but the issue of women deacons was referred for further study. However, the full impact of these and other proposals will depend on their implementation in the coming years.
4) While, as indicated above, the schism in the United Methodist Church (the largest in a century) already made our review in 2023, last year was decisive in two respects. First, the church’s General Conference repealed its 52-year-old declaration that the practice of homosexuality was “incompatible with Christian teaching,” thus allowing for the ordination of gay people and marriage for same-sex couples, while providing more dissenters with the grounds for a clean break. Secondly, the schism is being felt more on an international level (especially in Africa), even if the denomination is said to be taking a more decentralized approach. (May RW; July RW)
5) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s inauguration in January of the Ram temple in Ayodhya (Uttar Pradesh) marked the fulfillment of a goal of Hindu nationalists, who had led a campaign culminating in 1992 in the destruction by a large mob of a mosque built on the site of an earlier temple. It showed how far Hindu assertiveness has become mainstream in India, finding wide support beyond the ranks of activist groups in a country with an 80 percent Hindu population. The rise of Hindu nationalism has also translated into various legal measures, such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), and had an impact on minorities. However, significant electoral losses suffered by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2024, including in areas considered as strongholds, and the need to build coalitions suggest potential limits to the party’s growth, although its ideology still remains powerful and has permeated various institutions, including educational and cultural organizations. (June RW; Associated Press, April 19)
